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ABSTRACTS
37 S.E.2d 563 (1946). Both North Carolina, N.C. Acts, 1955,
ch. 813, § 5, and West Virginia, W. Va. Acts, 1959, ch. 47, have
since amended their statutes so that they now purport to extend
to an adopted child the same legal status as that of a legitimate
child.
In the Stewart case, the West Virginia court looked to the rights
of the adopted child under the adoption statute in constructing the
testator's intent. Unlike the court in the instant case, the West Vir-
ginia court applied the statute in effect at the time of adoption.
The West Virginia court impliedly would have admitted the adopted
child to the class of "heirs" or "legal heirs." Wheeling Dollar Sav-
ings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, supra at 712. There is a split of author-
ity as to which adoption statutes are controlling where the statutes
are not expressly retroactive. Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 960 (1951).
Recognizing the merit of the progressive minority holding and
the liberal bent of some of the majority, it would appear that the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia might now go either
way in delineating the rights of an adopted child under a stranger's
will. In any event a prudent attorney would be well advised to have
his client expressly state his intent as to adopted children so that the
instrument will not be left to construction in the courts.
Stephen Grant Young
ABSTRACTS
Due Process-Jurisdiction-Minimum Contact Not Satisfied
P, a resident of West Virginia, brought this action for personal
injury sustained from the exploding of a defective pipe which D,
a Texas corporation, sold to a company that used it in its business
in West Virginia. Under W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie
1961), P obtained substituted service of process and brought this
action in West Virginia. P offered no evidence that D was in-
corporated in, ever did business in, or ever made a contract to
be performed in West Virginia. D moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Held, motion to dismiss sustained. Mere commission
of a tort did not establish the necessary "minimum contacts" to
afford jurisdiction; and the West Virginia statute, in conferring juris-
diction over D, resulted in an extraterritorial application of law in
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derogation of due process. Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
In order that a foreign corporation may be subjected to the
jurisdiction of a state for service of process, the courts have de-
veloped the rule of minimum contacts. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The requirements for minimum
contact vary and must be applied to each factual situation. Orange-
Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174
(N.D. Ala. 1955); 65 W. VA. L. REV. 63 (1962); 59 W. VA. L.
REv. 369 (1957). In 59 W. VA. L. REv. 369 (1957), the author
criticizes the West Virginia statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1,
§ 71 (Michie 1962), and intimates that the statute will be restricted
in its application in the light of case decisions on a similar North
Carolina statute. 2B N.C. STAT. § 55-38.1 (Michie 1950).
Under the West Virginia statute, any party to a contract to
be performed wholly or partly in this state is subject to personal
service in any court action on the contract. In the instant case, the
requirement is not met because no act transpired in West Virginia
and therefore the case does not fall within the statute.
Real Property-Effect of the Rule in Shelley's Case
on Conveyances in West Virginia Today
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Rule in Shelley's Case
was not applicable since the word "heirs" meant that group of per-
sons who were to take at the termination of the life estate and not
"heirs" in an indefinite succession. The court stated, however, that
although the Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished in Illinois in 1953,
the rule was in force when the deed was executed and would have
been given full effect, if applicable. Arnold v. Baker, 185 N.E.2d
844 (Ill. 1962).
It was believed that the Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished
when West Virginia was formed since the Virginia statute, which
supposedly abolished the rule in that state, was carried over to
West Virginia as a part of its law. But in Carter v. Reserve Gas Co.,
84 W. Va. 741, 100 S.E. 738 (1919), the court held that the
statute did not extend to a conveyance to a person for life with
a remainder mediately, not immediately, to his heirs. Under this
strict construction, the court held that the statute only contemplated
the situation where there was a taking by a person for his life and
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after his death by his heirs. In 1931, the Rule was completely
abolished by statute. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 14 (Michie
1961).
If the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should fol-
low the reasoning of the court in the instant case, it is presumed
that it would hold that the rule would apply to transfers made
in West Virginia prior to 1931 wherein a person was given a
freehold estate with a mediate remainder to his heirs.
Timber-Right to Remove Timber for a Reasonable
. Time After Expiration of the Contract
P, grantee of a deed that conveyed certain timber rights, brought
an action for damages against D, grantor, for restraining him from
removing severed timber from the property. Under the deed, timber
was conveyed to P for a period of fifteen years and at the end of
the fifteen years, all the rights of the grantee terminated and any
uncut timber reverted to the grantor without any notice or action.
The deed also provided that the grantee would have an additional
year to remove any "lumber" that was manufactured during the
fifteen year period. P attempted to remove severed timber after
the fifteen year period elapsed. The trial court awarded damages
to P. Held, reversed. The grantee's title was defeasible and by his
failure to remove severed timber, he forfeited his right to the severed
timber. The additional one year only applied to "lumber" and not
severed "timber." Mace v. Carpenter, 127 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va.
1962).
The accepted rule allows removal of timber within a reasonable
time after the expiration of the contract where the purchaser has
severed the timber within the allotted time and has thereby con-
verted it from real estate to personalty. An exception to this rule
is if the parties stipulate otherwise in the contract. Lange & Crist
Box & Lumber Co. v. Haught, 132 W. Va. 530, 52 S.E.2d 695
(1949); Knight v. Smith, 84 W. Va. 714, 100 S.E. 504 (1919);
Null v. Elliott, 52 W. Va. 229, 43 S.E. 173 (1902).
In the instant case, the contract did not provide expressly that
severed timber would revert to the grantor, but the court held that
the contract implied that such severed timber would pass with the
uncut timber. The court reached the conclusion that the contract
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negated any reasonable time to remove any of the timber after the
termination of the lease with the sole exception of the additional one
year for manufactured lumber.
Wills-Denial of Right of Renunciation to
Administrator of Incompetent Widow
Husband left a will which provided that the remainder of his
estate be placed in trust and the income be paid his widow. Widow
was incompetent and died before any renunciation of the will. A
petition was brought by the administrator of the widow's estate
to determine whether the will should be renounced. The probate
court denied the petition. Held, affirmed. The right to renounce
a will is personal and died with the surviving spouse regardless of
her incompetency in the absence of fraud, concealment, or con-
flicting interest of her representative. Rock Island Bank & Trust
Co. v. First Natl Bank, 185 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1962).
The substance of the decision of the instant case is that the
legal representative of an incompetent widow, after her death, has
no right to exercise any election with regard to the will of the in-
competent's spouse. In the case of an incompetent, only the guardian
ad litem with the consent of the probate court may have the will
renounced, and in the absence of such action, even the incompetent
widow has no right of renunciation. Boyer v. Bealor, 271 F.2d
845 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Mead v. Phillips, 135 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1943); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 322 (1943).
The instant case represents the weight of authority concerning
judicial construction of statutes on this subject. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia has not construed the West Virginia
statute which affords a surviving husband or wife the right to re-
nounce his spouse's will in the same factual context as the instant
case. W. VA. CODE ch. 42, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1961).
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
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